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Abstract 
The challenge of enhancing the „democratic anchorage‟ of partnerships has become a 
central concern in policy studies.   Radical reform proposals designed to level the 
deliberative playing field include community veto powers and the appointment of neutral 
arbiters.  Welcome as they would be, however, it is questionable whether such reforms 
would overcome power asymmetries in the partnership arena.  A study of the local 
politics of social inclusion in two UK cities, Dundee and Hull, suggests that 
managerialism, driven by national governments, is eroding the prospects for partnership 
democratisation.  But more significantly for the reformist agenda, public managers and 
community activists think in incompatible frames about the role of partnerships and in 
ways that are not understood by the other party.  Non-communication undermines the 
prospects for an equitable deliberative consensus.  Insights from Bourdieu suggest that 
even in more favourable deliberative environments than those in Dundee and Hull, 
subtle manifestations of power in culture, discourse and bearing would undermine the 
potential for a Habermasian consensus between radically unequal actors.  In a radical 
departure from the network governance paradigm, it is therefore argued that 
empowerment may depend less on enhanced network democracy than on strong 
independent community organisation capable of acting separately and coercively against 
governing institutions and elites – an exit-action strategy.  These preliminary conclusions 
point to a substantial research agenda on the politics of the state-civil society nexus. 
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Introduction 
In response to widespread concern about the democratic deficit in partnerships, or 
governing networks (Rhodes, 1997), critics have begun considering how better 
„democratic anchorage‟ might be achieved in local collaborative institutions.1  Scholars 
including Diamond (2004), Skelcher (2005), Skelcher et al (2005) and Sorensen and 
Torfing (2005) argue for radical reforms aiming toward inclusive and accountable 
networks.  They believe that despite the difficulties inherent in democratising a 
polycentric governing system, communities can be empowered within democratised 
networks.  This paper challenges these claims, arguing that reformist scholars 
underestimate the challenge of democratic inclusion.  Instead, it proposes a radical break 
from the network „orthodoxy‟ in UK policy studies (Marinetto, 2003), advancing a case 
for „exit‟ by groups unable to secure full democratic inclusion in the partnership arena.   
 
The argument derives from Bourdieusian and Habermasian social critique; the former in 
an account of how class domination is secured in the „habituation‟ of social practice 
(Noble and Watkins, 2003), the latter of the corrosive effects of capitalist modernity on 
democracy.  Their insights help explain deliberative failure between public managers and 
community activists, revealed in an ESRC funded study of partnerships in Dundee and 
Hull.  The study illustrates that managerialism has eroded the prospects for partnership 
democratisation.  But more significantly, it reveals that public managers and community 
activists have contrasting commonsense understandings of partnership which, being 
unspoken cannot be articulated or deliberated.  This finding lends provisional support to 
the Bourdieusian idea that even if measures to enhance deliberative democracy were 
implemented, they would still reproduce inequalities rooted in the cultural and material 
resources of powerful actors; in this instance, local public service managers (Bourdieu, 
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1984, 1990a).  If power relations are embrocated in language and communication, then 
the possibility of rationally motivated consensus among unequal protagonists is radically 
restricted (Crossley, 2004).  This conclusion is a challenge to the partnership principle 
and points toward the need for effective „restraining barriers‟ to protect civil society from 
state domination (Habermas, 1987a: 364).  It suggests that community activists would be 
well advised to consider exiting partnerships, even in better deliberative conditions than 
those pertaining in Dundee and Hull.  This strategy finds support from theorists (Kohn, 
2000; Medearis, 2005) who argue that disempowered actors who carve out autonomous 
spaces and act coercively against dominant interests can influence governing outcomes 
better than those collaborating with governing elites.  This case for „exit-action‟ strategies 
opens up a challenging research agenda on the study of power at the state-civil society 
nexus (Mettler and Soss, 2004).   
 
The challenge of network democratisation 
Since the 1960s, UK governments have sought to promote collaborative local 
governance, successively involving local government and other public agencies, the 
business and voluntary sectors and community activists (Davies, 2002).  Governing 
networks, or partnerships, are hybrid organisations typically comprising state, market and 
civil society actors.  The most recent examples, like English Local Strategic Partnerships 
(Johnson and Osborne, 2003), are complex bureaucracies run by dedicated public 
managers.  It is widely accepted that there is a democratic deficit in these governing 
networks, despite community involvement.  For Skelcher et al (2005: 586) managerialism 
has become a dominant trend:  „technical expertise is privileged and decisions proceed 
through a rational process little impacted by the political world‟.  Perrons and Skyer‟s 
study of the Shoreditch New Deal for Communities regeneration partnership found that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 The terms „partnership‟ and „governing network‟ are here coterminous. 
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government imposed performance management regimes render „the task of adequately 
representing the community difficult – “virtually impossible”‟ (2003: 278).2  Such 
observations are common (Taylor, 2000; Amin, 2005).     
 
Managerialism can be justified on efficiency grounds and by appeal to the democratic 
legitimacy of elected governments.  Skelcher et al (2005) describe an „agency‟ model of 
partnership where the tasks of joined up governance, public responsiveness and effective 
performance management require strong public managers.  In this scenario, if 
community representatives impede effective programme delivery, managers and 
politicians may feel justified in circumventing local democratic procedures to secure 
public value from the public pound (Stoker, 2004: 190-1).  However, this argument fails 
where efficiency requires responsiveness to citizens.  Creating „public value‟ (Moore, 
1995) demands participatory governance.  Managers „can only know the meaning of 
public value … through dialogue with citizens‟ (Lowndes et al, 2006: 552).  For Sen 
(1999: 154), democracy is a crucial means by which public goods are defined and secured.  
In this light, partnership democratisation is a key governance challenge.    
 
What, then, are the strengths and weaknesses of proposals to democratise networks?  
The argument proceeds in three steps.  First setting out key ideas for network reform, 
the discussion then turns to a critical evaluation of these ideas in light of Bourdieu‟s 
analysis of how class power is secured through cultural capital.  The case is then 
advanced for alternative exit-action strategies to be pursued by disadvantaged groups in 
the event that democratic inclusion in partnership is unfeasible.  Key issues in this three-
part discussion are then framed as questions examined in the study of Dundee and Hull. 
                                                          
2 New Deal for Communities is a „flagship‟ regeneration programme, emblematic of the government‟s 
determination to engage communities in local governance.   
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Enhancing the democratic anchorage of partnerships 
What would democratic partnerships look like?  Dryzek‟s definition of deliberative 
democracy holds that „the essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought … in the 
ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about 
that decision‟ (Dryzek, 2000: v, cited in Medearis, 2005: 54 emphasis added by Medearis).  
Deliberative democracy demands not only participation, but also equal access to 
decisions by all citizens with a stake in them.  In partnership, however, this is impractical.  
At best, equal access to decisions for democratically selected, accountable and recallable 
community representatives would be informed by prior deliberative exercises with 
constituents.  
 
Generating an equitable democratic consensus in a radically unequal society requires a 
„counterfactual‟ space where real-world „status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized‟ 
(Fraser, 1990: 60).  Habermas‟s Theory of communicative action (TCA) (1984, 1987b) suggests 
that this space exists in the rules internal to discourse.  He argues: „[o]ur first sentence 
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus‟ (1971: 
314).  Consensual aspirations are internal to the practices of communication, beyond the 
influence of values or socioeconomic structures.  They are the „telos‟, the raison d‟etre, of 
any communicative encounter (1984: 247).  From this abstract principle, Habermas 
derives the claim that communicative reason, the disposition to engage in unrestricted, 
uncoerced deliberation, permits a discourse where participants overcome subjective bias 
„in favour of a rationally motivated agreement‟ (1987a: 315).  For Habermas, deliberation 
flourishes in „lifeworld‟, the „informal and unmarketized‟ domains of social life: political 
life beyond organised parties including voluntary organisations, trade unions, clubs and 
(in a bygone age) the media (Finlayson, 2005: 51).  Lifeworld is the realm of freedom 
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(Cook, 2005: 57) where unconstrained deliberation can take place between unequal actors 
on equitable terms.    
 
Following the spirit if not the letter of Habermas, scholars have taken up the challenge of 
enhancing the deliberative context in which partnership operates – what Sorensen and 
Torfing (2005) call „democratic anchorage‟.  Sorensen and Torfing specify normative 
regulations for the formation, functioning and output of governing networks.  First, all 
affected actors should be included in the construction of an open ended policy discourse.  
Oppositionists should have a voice and the opportunity to form an „alternative 
governance network‟.  However, they may still be excluded by non-decision making, or 
preference manipulation.  Therefore, the agenda must be „so broadly and vaguely defined 
that it is accessible for all the included actors‟ (2005: 213).  Second, each protagonist 
must show „agonistic respect‟ for other opinions and be committed to transparent, 
responsible decision making.  Network actors may engage in robust discussion, but they 
should be committed to reaching a „rough consensus‟, for which all share responsibility 
(2005: 213).  These procedures are Habermasian in that they are deliberative and 
uncoerced; depending on integrity, reflexivity and mutual respect among democratically 
minded interlocutors engaged in relatively unconstrained debate.3     
 
Other scholars, sceptical about the efficacy of normative regulation alone, argue that 
institutional reform is required to level the playing field.   Diamond (2004) argues that 
supervisory boards on which local residents form a majority should monitor the 
performance of public agencies, supported by community facilitators capable of shoring 
up resistance to overweening managers.  Similarly, Klijn and Koppenjan (1999) 
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recommend the appointment of neutral arbiters to maintain a level playing field in debate 
and arbitrate disputes between network actors.  In a more radical vein, Skelcher (2005) 
advocates a consociational solution, where community representatives would be given a 
veto over partnership decisions as a guarantee against domination by powerful others.  
He believes that consociationalism (Lijphart, 1968) could underpin a democratic „polity 
forming‟ model of governance, where disadvantaged groups can have an equal voice 
(Skelcher, 2005: 101).  While consociationalism violates Habermasian discourse ethics, 
relying on a coercive non-deliberative mechanism, the purpose would be to build 
confidence in the deliberative environment, making the veto redundant.  As such, the 
function of institutional reform is to ameliorate inequalities in the deliberative arena so 
that relatively open, uncoerced debate becomes feasible.  
 
Cultural capital and the limits of democratic deliberation 
The authors discussed above have done much to highlight the democratic deficit in 
governing networks and they set demanding criteria against which the democratic 
credentials of partnerships can be judged.  However, they may still underestimate the 
difficulty of bracketing social inequality to the extent required for deliberative equality.  
The protagonists could be persuaded to the virtues of deliberation, be trained in 
empathy, impartiality and non-coercive deliberative techniques (see Innes and Booher, 
1999) as required by Sorensen and Torfing and be delegated sufficient political autonomy 
to take meaningful decisions.  Class and other inequalities might be ameliorated through 
the institutional reforms discussed above.   However, even in these favourable 
circumstances equitable deliberation might be foreclosed by subtle manifestations of 
power in culture.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Sorensen and Torfing reject „the forceless force‟ of Habermas‟s communicative rationality.  They rely 
instead on what they call „contingently constructed democratic norms‟ (2005: 210-11).  However, they do 
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For Habermas, the potential for consensus lies in the pre-conscious rules inherent in any 
conversation.   However, he has been criticised for failing to show how the abstract, de-
contextualised principles of communicative action impact on real lifeworld 
conversations.  Bourdieusian scholars have drawn attention to a major problem with the 
TCA.  Where Habermas contends that the grounds for communicative reason lie in the 
rules internal to discourse, Bourdieu argues, based on empirical observation, that 
domination is „linguistically inscribed‟ and secured (at least partly) in the sub-conscious 
(Hayward, 2004: 5).  Crossley argues that „communication is always systematically 
distorted since the possibility of undistorted communication, if that means 
communication not structured through socially shaped habitus, is nil‟ (2004: 108).4   
Bourdieu‟s habitus calls into question the redemptive qualities of deliberative reasoning 
among radically unequal interlocutors (Fraser, 1990; Hayward, 2004).  How can 
deliberation recognise and overcome inequalities embodied in cultural capital (Crossley, 
2004) if cultural capital is inscribed in language and embedded in the sub-conscious 
commonsense?  The consensual aspirations embodied in Habermasian conversations 
maybe trumped by the cultural distinctions imprinted on accent, body language, posture 
and taste and which constitute the habitus.   
 
Bourdieusian thinking represents a serious theoretical challenge to advocates of a 
reformed network polity.  By whom and against what criteria would a neutral arbiter be 
appointed?  How might she recognise and enter into a struggle with her own class or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
not specify alternative mechanisms through which these norms might be constructed and sustained.    
4 Habitus refers to sub-conscious dispositions „acquired through experience‟ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 9).  Interestingly, 
in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas (1987: 326) describes lifeworld in terms resembling a 
collective habitus.  It is „an intuitive, unshakeably certain, and holistic knowledge, which cannot be made 
problematic at will‟.  It is an „amalgam of background assumptions, solidarities, and skills bred through 
socialization‟.    
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gendered habitus?  If she could be trained to do this, how would she recognise and 
overcome the cultural power exercised by others in what might appear to be an open 
debate?  If a veto was conceded to community activists, what would govern the 
interpretation and exercise of that veto?  For Bourdieu, it would be determined by 
convention and commonsense; the cultural capital accruing to actions in different social 
positions over time.  
 
The conundrum posed by cultural capital also highlights barriers to the construction of 
an open ended policy discourse around broad and vague problem definitions (Sorensen 
and Torfing, 2005: 213).  Bourdieu (1990a: 16) comments that „enlightenment is on the 
side of those who turn their spotlight on our blinkers‟, arguing that people of a „critical 
and reflexive disposition‟ can reflect on and challenge their commonsense.  But 
continuous self-criticism of sufficient sophistication to reveal nuances in the exercise of 
power would demand extraordinary skill from parties unfamiliar with Bourdieusian 
procedures.  For Bourdieu, even if reflexive parties could establish open conditions for 
debate, equality would demand that the terms of the ensuing discussion should be 
scrutinised and re-scrutinised to disclose the cultural capital embedded in the procedures 
of scrutiny.   If this critique stands up to empirical analysis, then partnerships may have 
little potential as vehicles for democratic inclusion  
 
The case for exit and coercion 
Advocates of partnership might object to the Bourdieusian critique on the grounds that it 
is better for marginal actors to be empowered imperfectly inside managerialist networks 
than not at all.  Given the defeats inflicted on the organised working class during the 
1980s and the evisceration of communities through industrial retrenchment, surely 
participatory partnerships represent progress (Amin, 2005: 618)?  The answer depends 
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on the viability of alternative community empowerment strategies.  One possibility is that 
exit from partnership, combined with coercive action to counter exclusionary practices, 
would enhance the influence of citizens in the governing arena in a way that partnership 
cannot.  Put another way, might „principled exit‟ combined with coercive action be an 
effective, non-deliberative mode of communication for groups disadvantaged in the 
distribution of cultural capital?    
 
In her critique of deliberative democracy, Kohn (2000: 425) argues that separation or 
critical distance permits the creation of protected space where social movements can 
„explore and test genuinely alternative ways of framing collective problems‟.  If governing 
institutions tend to reproduce the interests of dominant groups, then the disempowered 
have to build new institutions, incubating alternative approaches capable of gaining 
widespread acceptance (see also Fraser, 1990).  Habermas too is sensitive to the way 
instrumental rationality, exemplified by managerialism, undermines communicative 
rationality.  Agents within state and market „adopt an instrumental relationship towards 
nature and a strategic orientation towards each other in order to further their own 
success‟ (Cook, 2005: 57).  The instrumental rationality of state and market encroaches 
on lifeworld in a „parasitic‟ relationship which undermines communicative reason 
(Finlayson, 2005: 47).  Habermas calls this phenomenon „colonisation‟.  He therefore 
argues for „restraining barriers‟ to protect lifeworld against the tendency of capitalist 
development to erode communicative reason.  Lifeworld has to „assert itself against’ the 
colonising subsystems of capital and state power, if democratic impulses are to survive 
and thrive (Habermas, 1987a: 363-4 emphasis added).  Whether or not the system-lifeworld 
distinction stands up theoretically (see Cook, 2005 for a critique), the colonisation 
problematic is suggestive.  If lifeworld is undermined by state and market, then 
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governing networks which bind them together in hybrid form may lead to the further 
erosion of democratic space.  
 
Though separation is a necessary condition of democratic autonomy, it is insufficient.  
Says Kohn (2000: 426), „[r]ealizing abstractions such as reciprocity, equality and 
opportunity is usually a process of historical struggle rather than theoretical consensus‟. 
This struggle takes place not fundamentally through deliberation, but at „concrete sites of 
resistance, the literal, symbolic, and imaginary barricades, forums, and fortresses where 
the people mount challenges to currently hegemonic visions of collective life‟.  
Separation is a form of resistance, but political influence requires coercion.    
 
A powerful case for coercion has been made by Medearis (2005), who rejects the 
prohibition on force in deliberative theory.  He starts with Dryzek‟s above quoted 
definition of deliberative equality arguing that where hierarchical power is pervasive in 
public discourse, „marginal groups have no choice but to act coercively to achieve 
democratic aims‟.  Democratic theorists who value inclusive politics should therefore 
treat coercive tactics including strikes, demonstrations, pickets, blockades and other 
forms of civil disobedience with „great sympathy‟.  Legitimate coercive action is 
„necessarily strategic and non-deliberative but still thoroughly entwined in public 
discourse‟ (Medearis, 2005: 55).  Medearis moves beyond „agonism‟, which celebrates the 
inherently conflictual nature of politics (Dryzek, 2005: 220-222), to embrace 
„antagonism‟; the notion that where democratic inclusion cannot otherwise be secured 
force is legitimate. 
 
Medearis contends that coercion is justified when it is „reasonably oriented‟ toward 
democratizing institutions and social relations which „oppress and disadvantage some 
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groups, hindering their inclusion in political contention on equal terms‟ (2005: 74).  He 
argues that coercion has been used to great effect by social movements like the US civil 
rights movement, fighting for democracy (2005: 75).  He argues that coercion can  
 
…restructure discourse and coercively alter the social relations in which 
discourse is situated …threaten crucial interests, disrupt customary alliances and 
ordinary ways of doing things, and create crises. As a result, problems are made 
to seem more urgent, interlocutors are pressured to argue consistently, and 
parties are compelled to take actions and enter arenas of contention that they 
have avoided (Medearis, 2005: 55). 
 
Similarly, autonomous community, interest group or workplace organisations using 
coercive tactics might build powerful restraining barriers against state and market elites, 
legitimate from the standpoint of democratic inclusion.  
 
This discussion highlights important questions for research on partnerships.  Is the 
reform agenda advanced by Skelcher, Sorensen and Torfing and others feasible as a 
strategy for partnership democratisation?  Or would it be thwarted; if not by the 
hegemony of managerialism then by power inscribed in language and culture?  Does 
Bourdieu exaggerate the subconscious determination of cultural practice and underplay 
individual autonomy and our capacity for conscious reflection (Hayward, 2004: 12-13)?  
If not, might community activists secure greater leverage through exit-action strategies 
than through participation in partnership?  These are big questions which the study of 
Dundee and Hull begins to address. 
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The Local Politics of Social Inclusion in Dundee and Hull  
Hull (England) and Dundee (Scotland) are coastal cities which suffered 
disproportionately from industrial retrenchment in the 1970s and 80s.  Both feature 
prominently in government deprivation indices and are major tests of government 
policies for social inclusion and partnership.  The research conducted between June 2004 
and July 2005 explored the political dimensions of partnership often buried under 
formal, abstract consensus (Davies, 2005; Fairclough, 2000).  In Distinction, Bourdieu 
(1984: 460) argues that the political environment tends to produce closure by „tacitly 
presenting the universe of realized possibles as the universe of possible possibles, thus 
delimiting the universe of the politically thinkable‟.  The study sought to counter this 
tendency by posing open questions such as „can partnership contribute to the creation of 
a more inclusive society‟?  The questions sought to draw respondents into a dialogue 
about the local politics underpinning the „social exclusion‟ discourse and the efficacy of 
partnership for „social inclusion‟.   
 
The author conducted 53 interviews, 28 in Dundee and 25 in Hull, with respondents 
drawn mainly from local authorities, public agencies and community groups.  
Interviewees were enlisted from the city strategic partnership CityVision5 and the East 
Area Partnership in Hull; and the city strategic Dundee Partnership and the 
neighbourhood based Social Inclusion Partnership in Dundee.  The research focused 
primarily on the perspective of public managers and community activists, reflecting their 
numerical preponderance in the partnership arena.6     
 
                                                          
5 Recently renamed the One Hull partnership.  
6 Two Hull city councillors were interviewed, but none from Dundee.  There were no elected councillors 
on the bodies responsible for the day to day management of the Dundee Partnership, or on the Social 
Inclusion Partnership Board.   
 14 
Interview transcripts were coded thematically and analysed using NVIVO.  
Unanticipated themes emerged inductively during coding, including the problem of „non-
communication‟ between public managers and community activists discussed below.7  
NVIVO analysis revealed that key terms in the language of management like 
„performance‟ and „deliver‟ were used almost exclusively by public managers.  Terms in 
the lexicon of democracy such as „listen‟ and „involve‟ were used more frequently by 
community activists.  Analysis of the text around key terms highlighted the 
communicative disjuncture which is illustrated below using quotations.       
 
The function of strategic partnerships 
All cities in England and Scotland have strategic partnerships; Community Planning 
Partnerships (CPPs) in Scotland (The Dundee Partnership) and Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) in England (Hull CityVision).  English LSPs evolved in the late 
1990s as part of the UK government‟s strategy for more responsive, better coordinated 
public services (Johnson and Osborne, 2003; Russell, 2001).  Both LSPs and CPPs are 
charged with bringing together local agencies, voluntary organisations, businesses and 
community activists to formulate a coordinated approach to public service delivery and 
meet social, economic and environmental needs.8  Crucially, they are expected to engage 
local communities as core partners (DETR, 2001; Scottish Executive, 2002).  They are 
also expected to produce community plans in consultation with relevant stakeholders and 
citizens.9  A typical community plan specifies five or six key priorities identified by a wide 
range of „stakeholders‟ in often extensive consultation exercises.   Once a plan is agreed, 
                                                          
7 The paper is now presented in the form of deductive analysis because the research cast light on important 
theoretical questions which had not been uppermost in the author‟s mind at the time of the study. 
8 LSPs have no statutory duties, unlike CPPs under the Local Government in Scotland Act, 2003. 
9 In England, formal responsibility for developing community plans lies with local authorities.  However, 
the process is often led by LSPs.  
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the partnership is charged with ensuring that it is delivered; all partners, including 
community activists, must work toward specified goals and targets.   
 
The limits of deliberation (1): Creeping managerialism 
Partnership arrangements in both cities were undergoing reorganisation during the study, 
a consequence of perceived ineffectiveness in delivering national targets and local 
community plans.  In Dundee, the restructuring marked the closure of the Social 
Inclusion Partnership (SIP) and the establishment of the statutory CPP in 2005.  The 
Dundee SIP was established in 1999 to administer the Social Inclusion Partnership Fund, 
a Scottish Office regeneration programme.  SIP had a strong community focus and 
community activists formed a majority on the Board.  Nationally, however, the SIP 
programme was judged not to have delivered national or local strategic priorities.  For 
Communities Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2003: 12), future programmes should 
articulate a „clearer, more defined link between national, local and neighbourhood 
priorities‟.  The absorption of SIP by the Dundee Partnership was a step in this direction.   
 
This development was a major source of controversy in Dundee.  Local public managers 
agreed that community planning would enhance the coordination of mainstream agency 
spending.   Through SIP, community activists had hitherto enjoyed formal control over 
an annual budget of some £2.5 million.   A senior City Council manager explained that 
community control had been conceded by a local authority keen to overcome 
accusations of Council control-freakery.  However, s/he thought that community control 
had gone too far; „we're in danger of going the opposite way … we've lost strategic 
influence... and maybe the pendulum needs to swing back a bit more towards fifty/fifty 
but it was absolutely right in my mind that it went towards community control…‟.   
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The Dundee Partnership was the instrument designed to reassert strategic influence.  
Community representation was to be organised through a system of community 
regeneration forums in five deprived areas of Dundee, each of which nominated one 
delegate to the Building Stronger Communities strategic theme group of the Dundee 
Partnership.  In an organisational hierarchy, the strategic theme groups sat fourth under 
the Dundee Partnership forum, management and coordinating groups with community 
regeneration forums effectively a fifth tier.   Primary responsibility for partnership 
decisions lay with the management group of senior managers and responsibility for 
delivery with the coordinating group of middle managers.  Community representation 
was limited on the former group, non-existent on the latter.    
 
The above quoted manager argued that while the closure of SIP meant that community 
activists would have to give up „sovereignty over decisions of a smaller nature‟, 
community planning should „increase community decision making over strategic 
decisions ...‟.   However, s/he acknowledged that public agencies under financial pressure 
would seek to „realign Social Inclusion Partnership funding‟ against priorities set by the 
Scottish Executive.  Community activists were thus „quite rightly‟ concerned.     
 
Community activists from the SIP Board were indeed concerned.  One activist already 
concerned about a „them and us‟ relationship between activists and public managers 
feared that community planning would lead to „an even higher them and us‟.  For a 
second activist, „I don't think there's going to be any community involvement.  As a 
matter of fact … They shouldn't have put „community‟ in there at all, like.  They should 
have just made it “The Partnership”‟.   Such concerns were shared by a wider group of 
community activists, project workers and community regeneration managers.  An anti-
poverty project manager concluded: 
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… you get people … being used and abused by, em, officers of the Council and 
others, em, while they were saying all the right things and doing all the right 
things that they wanted they were fine, when they weren't they were discarded 
like snow off a dyke on a hot day.    
 
The tension between community empowerment and strategic coordination was even 
more pronounced in Hull.  Hull was the only English city council condemned as „poor‟ 
in a 2004 government inspection (Lowndes et al, 2006: 550).10  This stigma led to the 
imposition of special measures and intense government scrutiny.  Hull may be 
exceptional in this regard but at the same time may highlight the relative priority 
accorded to democratic deliberation and managerial control in localities judged to be 
underperforming.11  
 
In response to this crisis, city councillors and public managers, supported by central 
government advisors, recognised that CityVision needed restructuring.  The goal, as in 
Dundee, was to improve strategic focus and create structures functional for effective 
decision making, public service coordination and performance management.  The 
managerial rationale for restructuring was partly the poor relationship between the city 
council and community activists (see Lowndes et al, 2006: 554) and partly the failure of 
performance management.  One partnership manager connected the two issues: 
 
                                                          
10  English local authorities are required to submit to „Comprehensive Performance Assessment‟ by the 
Audit commission. 
11 Lowndes et al (2006: 554) are unimpressed with the political culture in Hull, describing a „paternalistic, 
patronage-based form of local politics that continues to dominate, despite recent changes in formal 
political structures‟. 
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… and so you had a network team,12 you know, able to operate completely in 
isolation of any sort of performance management or need to demonstrate what 
value it was adding to the LSP … The community network doesn't want to co-
operate, because I think it's frightened that if it really does look hard it might find 
it difficult to demonstrate, in the terms that the NRU13 measures us against, 
exactly what impact's being made. 
  
With community activists viewed as an impediment to effective partnership, one   
priority for restructuring was to reduce the size of the Board and reduce community 
representation on it.  Said a leading city councillor on CityVision: 
 
I mean, putting it bluntly, there's too many of them.  We have three members of 
the private sector around the table and something like eight members of the 
community and voluntary sector, so they can dominate things.   
 
A partnership manager anticipated a struggle over the restructuring and warned that a 
forceful approach would be taken if necessary: 
 
… we're not going to be going to the Board with a sort of 'what do you think 
about this‟? because it just… we won't get anywhere.  … I think what we will 
have to say is, 'Look, you know, this is some work.  It's based on best practice.  
NRU wants this to happen and it's going to happen. … And I think, you know, 
then just be prepared for all sorts of you know, awful sort of repercussions.   
                                                          
12 Representatives on CityVision from the Hull Community Network. This organisation was financed from 
the UK Government‟s Community Empowerment Fund, designed to involve the community sector in 
LSPs.     
13 The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit within the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. 
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In addition, agenda quality control procedures were to be enhanced following several 
instances of what one manager called „really appalling, badly thought out and completely 
irrelevant presentations‟ from the Hull Community Network.  These procedures were 
intended to ensure that presentations conformed to professional standards and perceived 
needs.  The same manager explained that government advisors had been „very clear that 
this is the way that the LSP is going to operate in future‟.  So, if community presentations 
do not pass the quality check, the Board will say, 'no thank you.  … And I mean this was 
absolutely, you know, startling to the Network ‟.    
 
As in Dundee, community activists were critical of partnership arrangements, wanting a 
greater say, not less.  One community activist complained: „I've been a victim of social 
exclusion‟.  Arguing that he had been prevented by a Council officer from chairing a 
partnership committee, he concluded „that is more than insulting, degrading ...so to me, 
that‟s social exclusion ...‟.  Another Hull activist argued similarly that CityVision itself 
„promotes exclusion … tremendous exclusion‟.  S/he continued „…I think if the body 
that is set up to try to tackle social exclusion, from a strategic point of view, can't be 
inclusive itself, then I think you've got no chance‟.   
 
The processes described in Dundee and Hull are evidence of agenda gate-keeping 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), where basic organisational principles are placed beyond 
deliberation.  The democratic legitimacy of community activists is open to question; in 
neither case were they elected from the publics they purported to represent.14  At issue, 
however, is that as government funded „stakeholders‟, activists were excluded from 
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decisions they would have been party to given equal access.  If misgivings were expressed 
in a forum where all had equal access to decisions and unrestricted deliberation was 
possible, the sceptics could hold sway through argument where in reality they could not.   
 
These examples challenge deliberative democratic theory only insofar as they highlight 
the erosion of deliberative space and the advance of instrumental reasoning in the 
partnership arena; a process suggestive of „colonisation‟.  The question at this juncture, 
however, is not whether democratic deliberation might be possible in a permissive 
context, but what are the prospects of a permissive context being created?  The advance 
of managerialism in Dundee and Hull suggests that they are poor.  However, the study 
also identified cultural barriers to equitable deliberation, which would be hard to 
overcome even in more favourable circumstances.   
 
The limits of deliberation (2): Non-communication 
In addition to creeping managerialism, both cases highlighted a lack of mutual 
understanding between activists and managers, revealed through contrasting 
commonsense readings of the purpose of community regeneration funds – and by 
extension of partnerships.  In Dundee, this was discernable in the tendency of activists to 
identify the term „social inclusion‟ with SIP programme funds or with democratic voice, 
in contrast with the typical managerial identification of social inclusion with access to 
socioeconomic goods.  The management perspective on SIP emphasised value for 
money.  Said one manager: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 The case of New Deal for Communities suggests that similar managerialist trends are encountered even 
when residents are elected to partnership Boards (Perrons and Skyer, 2003; Lawless, 2004). 
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… certainly it's very frustrating, em, seeing all these applications for relatively 
small amounts of money, em, coming forward without any, em, apparent, em, 
link to any of the strategies or strands and it's difficult to say, "well, how does this 
address, em, deprivation in a strategic way?" 
 
A second manager, referring to the variable quality of network projects commented: 
 
there was no kinda rhyme nor reason really to why the network had got involved 
in all of them, so that raised a bit of an issue about, "well, wait a minute, we're 
doing an awful lot of stuff here, but should we be doing it?"  Because we guessed 
like that the regeneration funding is not a bottomless pit, so we had to be able to 
demonstrate that what we do with our allocation of taxpayers' money is actually 
making a difference... 
 
The activists, on the other hand, bemoaned the barriers to accessing SIP funds.  Asked 
whether s/he found the idea of „social inclusion‟ helpful in addressing Dundee‟s 
problems, one activist gave this characteristic response.  „Well I think it‟s just another, eh, 
fund that people can tap into … to improve their area‟.  Interpreting SIP this way, 
activists became frustrated at perceived bureaucracy.  Said a second activist comparing 
SIP funding unfavourably with an earlier programme: „we got on wi things, we didnae 
have this kinda hassle for funding.  I mean, you wouldna believe the hoops and the agro 
I've had ower twenty-five thousand pound funding‟.   
 
These comments point to contrasting understandings of the function of the SIP 
programme.  The activists saw it as a resource to support community projects, 
demanding looser financial control.  Public managers saw it as a vehicle to deliver the 
 22 
strategic goals set out in the community plan, demanding tighter financial control. 
Crucially, each party lacked a basic understanding of the rationale of the other, a 
communicative gap attributable to contrasting cultural interpretations of SIP: 
coordinated governance on the part of public managers, community led regeneration on 
the part of community activists.  Perhaps the most interesting feature of this gap was 
what it revealed about contrasting understandings of „social inclusion‟ itself.  Nominally 
the common value at the heart of partnership in Dundee, the terminology meant 
different things to different actors at the level of commonsense, beyond immediate 
deliberative reach. 
 
In Hull, conflict over government funds revealed a similar communicative disjuncture. 
The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) was allocated to 88 deprived local authority 
areas in England, including Hull to fund experiments in joined up, responsive public 
service delivery (Wallace, 2001).  Localities are expected to use it to achieve central 
government „floor targets‟ – the baseline standard in domains against which deprivation 
is measured.15  However, NRF was the subject of a political struggle.  Hull City Council‟s 
perspective was explained by a senior Councillor: 
 
…the community and voluntary sector have seen it as their own bank account, 
which it isn't.  There's been endless wars … about how much of NRF is spent in 
local government ... there's this constant row about what schemes have got it and 
who's going to get it next year and who didn't get it this year.   
 
A partnership manager commented on starting work in Hull:  
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…I thought, „Well this is a piece of cake because it's so obvious what the 
priorities are.‟  But what I hadn't bargained for was that the interest groups that 
were lobbying so hard to make sure that their sort of area of influence wasn't left 
out.  And yet this was exactly what Joe Montgomery was saying we hadn't got to 
do.16   
 
S/he continued  „…we do have a particularly unpleasant relationship with our 
community network … the, sort of, the power politics that are really quite unpleasant 
and you wouldn't expect to get them from the network‟: 
 
And I mean LSPs aren't about voting.  They are about consensus politics, but 
unfortunately, with our Community Empowerment Network there is a real desire 
to, you know, dictate the agenda and to behave in ways that aren't conducive to 
partnership working.  
 
The activist perspective was very different. One said of NRF:  
 
…the LSP guidebook says, you know about this neighbourhood... NRF, 
neighbourhood renewal funding … where local people from their own areas will 
decide, get together and help create, um, you know… close your eyes for, err, 
five minutes and see how you're estate would look in fifteen years time, how 
would you like to look.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 The principle domains are health, housing, jobs, education and crime (Johnson and Osborne, 2003).    
16  At the time, Joe Montgomery was head of the NRU. 
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He felt that this vision of NRF had „gone off the track a little bit‟, arguing of the 
community „just built in them is that they think they're never going to be listened to‟.   A 
second activist argued:   
 
What neighbourhood renewal funding and the LSP has done is pull that money 
back under the City Council control and (inaudible) area … and they allocated 
little bits to the various different areas, but they've kept the bulk in the city centre 
to support the local services … 
 
He intimated that local activists were surprised at this behaviour: „[w]hether they17 
actually appreciated that they would actually hand over control of the bulk of 
neighbourhood renewal money to their local council ...?  No.  Definitely not‟. 
 
As in Dundee, these comments illustrate the lack of understanding each party had for the 
rationale of the other.  The councillor/public manager perspective reflected frustration at 
the seemingly incomprehensible behaviour of the activists.  Among activists, there was 
suspicion and mistrust of Council and CityVision managers; a feeling of marginalisation 
mirroring frustration and lack of comprehension on the management side.    
 
Rethinking community empowerment  
The study suggests that the prospects for partnership democratisation maybe thwarted at 
two levels: the continuing advance of managerialism and the intractability of cultural 
inequalities.  While local managers typically shared the managerialist ethos, the main 
drivers of partnership restructuring were national governments.  Arguably, debate was 
hobbled at the outset by the managerialist governance paradigm currently ascendant in 
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the UK (Skelcher et al, 2005).  The findings support Jayasuriya‟s point that the dominant 
network paradigm globally is „tethered to a broader pattern of economic 
constitutionalism‟.  Hence, network governance is designed to „activate modes of 
conduct appropriate to an efficient market economy‟ (Jayasuriya, 2003: 5).  In this 
paradigm the normative framework is pre-given and closed to deliberation (Amin, 2005).   
Marquand accuses the UK government of augmenting the „monarchical‟ state tradition in 
the UK, intervening coercively in every corner of social life and reducing public debate to 
„monochrome monism‟ (2004: 126-7).  From a prominent scholar of moderate political 
views, this is a damning indictment and it suggests that the prospect for reversing 
managerialism is remote in the foreseeable future.  If government is part of the problem, 
an alternative agent of change is required.   
 
However, communication failure between community activists and public managers 
points potentially to a more intractable problem with partnership.  Crossley‟s 
Bourdieusian analysis (2004: 108) explains how cultural power inscribed in language 
closes communicative channels: 
 
The perceptual and linguistic schemes of the habitus shape the ways in which 
agents make sense or fail to make sense of each other‟s communications.  … It 
may mean that they „miss the point‟ or just fail to make any sense of what is 
communicated.  Whatever the details, however, communication is always a 
meeting of habitus and the chances of a consensual meaning being arrived at are 
always less likely if interlocutors are more distant in social space. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 „They‟ meaning local communities.   
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The sources of communicative failure in Dundee and Hull can be traced to contrasting 
understandings of the language of empowerment based on the cultural pre-suppositions 
of the protagonists.  The main function of strategic partnerships in Dundee and Hull 
appeared to be not democratic „cogovernance‟ but managerial „coordination‟ (Johnson 
and Osborne, 2003: 151).   This nuance in governmental thinking might be apparent to a 
public manager with a compatible feel for the governance game, but not to a community 
activist who sees „social inclusion‟ as a way to gain a voice or access project funding.  
Skelcher et al (2005: 590) support this interpretation, finding that public managers 
expressed „puzzlement‟ when asked about the public accountability of partnerships 
because the very question was incongruent with their managerialist assumptions.  In 
Dundee and Hull, because the inherent rightness of each perspective was taken for 
granted and beyond conscious reflection, deliberation was precluded.   The language of 
community empowerment was contested, but the protagonists did not share a common 
discursive repertoire sufficient to grasp why they differed, let alone achieve a rationally 
motivated consensus.   
 
These insights suggest that the implications of Bourdieusian theory should be taken 
seriously, both analytically and in determining the most effective strategies for 
disadvantaged groups.  The study did not achieve great insight into the habitus of the 
protagonists, a much more substantial research endeavour (Hayward, 2004).  However, 
communicative failure, which derived from the distinctive commonsense understandings 
of public managers and community activists, can be sourced to habitus (see Painter, 1997).    
 
These conclusions suggest that the reforms proposed by Skelcher, Sorensen and Torfing 
and others underestimate the challenge of network democratisation.  Where incompatible 
commonsense understandings of purpose combine with both blatant and subtle 
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inequalities in political power the prospects for an equitable consensus seem poor.  The 
Bourdieusian extension of this argument is that even if in favourable political weather 
new procedures were introduced to regulate and enhance network democracy, power 
asymmetries would still be reproduced in those very procedures by actors oblivious to 
their cultural capital.  This conclusion cannot be inferred directly from Dundee and Hull, 
but the study is evocative of the challenge to deliberative democracy posed by cultural 
capital and points to the need for substantial research around these questions.   
 
The feasibility of exit from partnership 
Whether or not the argument can be generalised to more favourable deliberative 
situations, the combination of advancing managerialism and communication failure 
suggests that community activists in Dundee and Hull would do well to consider exit-
action strategies.  The notion that community organisations should exit partnerships and 
act coercively against governing institutions to secure a democratic voice violates 
Habermasian discourse ethics and the tenets of deliberative democracy.  But if Medearis 
is right, it might be an effective way of resisting managerialism and holding government 
to its democratic commitments.   
 
The question of where actors should position themselves in the democratic process 
requires a situational analysis of power: an agent‟s capacities in a given social context 
(Callinicos, 2006: 188-189).  What, then, makes partnership exit attractive from the 
standpoint of democratic empowerment?  First, the principle of partnership itself 
forecloses coercion as a political strategy: its customs and procedures abjure coercive 
practices (Collins, 1999).  Commitment to partnership entails a priori recognition of 
partners and cedes the right (if not the inclination) to act coercively against them in 
favour of persuasion or respectful agonism.  The freedom to act coercively therefore 
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depends on the would-be antagonist separating herself from partnership arena and 
partnership ethos.    
 
Collins‟ (1999) study of the Ferguslie Park regeneration partnership in Paisley (Scotland) 
highlights the situational advantage that partnership confers on public managers and 
political elites when conflict occurs.  He explains how the Scottish Office attempted to 
establish a shared language of partnership during the late 1980s, with some success.  
However, with the onset of the struggle against the Poll Tax, angry community activists 
turned to a language of confrontation, challenging the partnership ethos.  This 
development created a crisis and the only solution available to governing elites 
commensurate with the partnership agenda was to marginalise the activists.  The system 
of community representation from local action groups was replaced by a „community 
forum‟, a top-down manoeuvre which effectively eliminated community representation 
because of the delay in creating the new structure (Collins, 1999: 85-6).  In this scenario it 
is arguable that activists would have been well advised to exit on their own terms and use 
the momentum generated by the anti-poll tax movement to campaign for a different 
politics of regeneration.    
 
Second, alienated community activists in Dundee and Hull might be open to the idea that 
they would be better off organising than participating in partnership.  Bourdieu, despite 
facing accusations of „fatalism‟ (Callinicos, 1999: 295), specifies ways that habitus can be 
transformed.  Critical subjects have greater agency than the credulous (see also Crossley, 
2003), but perhaps more importantly there is no necessary adjustment of individual 
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habitus to a field of social action in which it is situated (Bourdieu, 1990a: 108).18  The 
„game‟ begins to feel uncomfortable when it presents unfamiliar challenges and the rules 
may then be challenged.  What was commonsense then resurfaces in political contention 
(1990a: 101).  This maladjustment of habitus to field was evident in Dundee and Hull.  
While virtually all the community activists were committed to the principle of 
partnership, their expectations were frustrated and they articulated a critique of 
partnership practice from the standpoint of democracy.  These perspectives were 
illustrative of what Crossley (2003: 52) approvingly calls „perceptual-cognitive schemas 
which dispose agents to question, criticize and distrust political elites and processes‟.   
 
The effectiveness of exit-action strategies hangs, thirdly, on the potential for reviving and 
radicalising community based organisation in the UK.  Do community critics of 
partnership have, or have an outlook favourable to developing, the political inclinations 
necessary to transform critique into action (Crossley, 2003: 52)?  There have been few 
direct action movements in the UK in recent years.  The victorious anti poll tax 
movement of 1989-1992 is the most recent example of a major locally based campaign 
using coercive tactics: non-payment, courtroom disruption, physical defence of property 
against bailiffs, mass demonstrations and a riot against police and property in Trafalgar 
Square (Burns, 1992).  Despite relative quiescence since, there is no reason to think that 
exit-action strategies cannot secure political influence.  The Citizen Organising 
Foundation is one prominent community group critical of strategic partnerships and 
networking, which it labels „not working‟ (cited in Dobson, June 2005).  It has shown 
that organising and campaigning can win concessions.  For example, the living wage 
campaign organised by an affiliate organisation TELCO, was instrumental in securing a 
                                                          
18 By field, Bourdieu means a structuring arena external to the embodied habitus.  The network arena 
constitutes a political sub-field.  The distinction between habitus and field is that between „history made body 
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significant pay rise for cleaners at Canary Wharf, in alliance with the Transport and 
General Workers Union.19  The campaign was only mildly coercive, relying on agitating, 
lobbying and naming and shaming, but it illustrated the power of autonomous 
organisation and is one practical example for disillusioned partnership activists to 
emulate.  The redemptive capacity of the public sphere(s) should not be overstated 
(Edwards, 2004) but such mobilisations may be more empowering than the experience of 
frustration and effective subordination in depoliticised partnerships, regardless of 
outcome.   
 
The task therefore falls to local movements and activist critics to show that exit-action 
strategies are more empowering than partnership.  But it also falls to scholars with ample 
opportunity to contribute to public debate. Much intellectual energy has been dedicated 
to the challenge of building democratically anchored networks and enhancing community 
participation.  Similar scholarly energy could be put into developing „good practice‟ for 
autonomous community organisations acting as a bulwark against colonisation and as 
part of a public sphere where „citizens can debate the ends and means of governance‟ 
(Edwards, 2004: 14-15; Wills, 2004).20   
 
One regeneration manager commenting on this paper said: „whilst communities in 
Dundee will take the money they still stubbornly from a statist perspective refuse to 
swallow the propaganda‟.  Exit may therefore have costs and activists may think it 
advantageous to participate in order to access government funds, even if they do not buy 
into the partnership ideal.  But such a strategy may not be sustainable, given increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and history made thing‟ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 190).   
19 TELCO is The East London Community Organisation.   
20 Scholars urging communities to take direct action are unlikely to be taken seriously without first earning 
their respect.  This was Bourdieu‟s achievement as a public intellectual.   
 31 
pressure on local partnerships to deliver national targets.  Stoecker (2003), exploring the 
dialectic between community organising (resistance) and community development 
(partnership) in the US, suggests that communities can both organise and participate.  He 
argues that communities need to organise to „get the power‟, but that community 
development, the procurement of technical and financial resources, is necessary to keep 
it.  Nevertheless, he cautions that where community organising and community 
development are fused in hybrid organisations, development tends to proceed at the 
expense of organising (2003: 496-7).  Moreover, these examples of „maximising‟ 
behaviour mirror the instrumental rationality of managerialism, violating the principles of 
deliberative democracy in equal degree.  Ultimately, the choice between participation and 
exit is tactical and context specific.  But in Dundee and Hull, the case for exit-action 
strategies is strong. Partnership seemed very unlikely to enhance democratic inclusion.    
 
Conclusion 
There is a substantial body of research supporting the notion that local governance is 
following a mangerialist path, with political power increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of local public managers charged with interpreting and delivering the agenda of national 
governments (Perrons and Skyer, 2003; Lawless, 2004; Davies, 2005).  But creeping 
managerialism is not necessarily fatal to the case for partnership democracy unless it is a 
symptom of ineluctable colonisation – a matter for further research.  If we allow that a 
favourable political environment might be created, then the question is whether 
inequalities between partners could be bracketed to the extent necessary for equitable 
deliberative decision making (Fraser, 1990).  The finding in Dundee and Hull that 
inequalities are re-enforced by communication failure lends provisional support to the 
Bourdieusian conjecture that they would not.  However, the validity of this conjecture 
can only be determined through substantial and rigorous research.  It might usefully be 
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reframed as a hypothesis: in radically unequal societies, the inscription of political power in language 
and culture means that structures designed to be inclusive and empowering will tend to reproduce the 
inequalities they seek to overcome.  Hence, in seemingly inclusive institutions achieving an 
uncoerced deliberative consensus (if such exist in the UK or elsewhere), the challenge 
would be to determine how far consensus was open and equitable; achieved by reflective 
and reflexive actors capable of bracketing status or distorted in virtue of the distinct 
cultural capital possessed by each.  Such research could be conducted in a range of 
encounters between state and civil society, casting light on the tractability both of cultural 
capital and of colonisation.   
  
The incompatible commonsense framings of collaborative purpose found in Dundee and 
Hull are perhaps the least challenging elements of habitus for research.  Understanding 
the impact of accent, posture, body language, movement - the signatures of cultural 
distinction – requires the development of nuanced research methodologies.  Here, 
engagement with Bourdieu‟s empirical research may prove fruitful (Crossley, 2003: 63-4).  
Hayward (2004: 18) suggests that the methods of cognitive science could also be helpful 
in conducting research on the impact of cultural capital in state-citizen interactions.  
Other approaches might include conversational and textual analysis, observation, 
deliberative experiments and interviews.  Such research programmes examining class, 
gender and other forms of cultural distinction could add much to our understanding of 
whether participative environments empower or subordinate active citizens.  
 
_________________________ 
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